TYDI is a profitable, home-based NZ online retailer of refurbished / box-damaged / end-of-line consumer electronics — refurbished Dyson vacuums (V6–V15 under a supply contract), laptops, tablets, phones, audio, cameras and smart home — sold through its own site (tydi.co.nz) and a Trade Me store. It turns over ~$794k/yr at a ~46% gross margin and produces ~$173k average owner earnings (SDE).
It is offered at $150,000 + stock at valuation — roughly 0.81× earnings, well below the 2–3× that comparable NZ online retailers command. The vendors are exiting on health grounds (they themselves acquired it ~6 weeks before listing).
The investment case is not a turnaround — it's an activation. The business has proven demand and lean economics but has never been marketed on the high-intent channels: $0 on Google (Search/Shopping) despite ~$23–30k/yr already spent on Trade Me promotions and social, a search-invisible website (Domain Rating 2.2, ~17 organic visits/month), and a dormant customer database. The play is to professionalise the existing spend and switch on the channels that are cold — not to market from a zero base. The acquirer is a professional digital-marketing operator for whom the entire growth playbook — paid search, SEO, CRM, marketplaces — is core competency.
Plan: acquire on a conditional, earnout-protected basis; switch on five demand-side levers; grow revenue from ~$794k to ~$1.85M and owner-independent EBITDA from ~$95k to ~$360k over three years; exit (optional) at an expanded multiple for a ~2.5–3× return, with downside covered by realisable inventory.
A going concern: brand & trading name, tydi.co.nz, the Trade Me store, supplier relationships (incl. the Dyson supply contract), the customer database & email list, IP/domains/socials, operating procedures, and ~$275k (liquidation value) of stock purchased separately at valuation.
| Signal | Evidence | Implication |
|---|---|---|
| No Google/search acquisition | $0 on Google; 0 paid keywords (Ahrefs, Jun 2026) — note ~$23–30k/yr already runs on Trade Me promos + social | The highest-intent channel is cold; existing spend just isn't on search yet |
| Search-invisible | DR 2.2/100; 37 organic keywords; ~17 visits/mo | Site can't capture demand it already ranks for |
| Demand already there | Ranks #27–39 for ~8,000 monthly searches of its own products (e.g. "dyson v8" 2,600/mo @ #27) | Capture, don't create — fastest, cheapest lever |
| Dormant database | Existing buyer list, "active email subscriber list" (IM) | High-margin repeat & cross-sell untapped |
| Motivated sale | Health-driven exit; 0.81× earnings | Price well below market for a profitable book |
TYDI occupies an uncontested intersection: NZ-owned + broad multi-category + Dyson supply line + dual-channel (own site + Trade Me).
| Competitor type | Examples | Their limitation |
|---|---|---|
| Refurb marketplaces | Reebelo (foreign-owned, 100+ 3rd-party vendors); Back Market (absent from NZ) | No local ownership/trust; inconsistent vendor quality |
| Big-retail clearance/refurb | PB Tech, Noel Leeming, Harvey Norman | Computer/clearance-narrow; physical-retail overhead |
| Official Dyson Renewed | dyson.co.nz | Recent models only, final-sale, no returns |
| Trade Me power-sellers | Mighty Ape + fragmented sellers | Not refurb-branded; fragmented |
Differentiated on: local trust, range breadth, the Dyson supply line, Trade Me distribution, lean price flexibility.
Vulnerable on: brand awareness, Reebelo's marketing budget, incumbents' established warranties — all addressable by the marketing capability being brought in.
Open adjacent ground: the fragmented Dyson parts & accessories aftermarket — a high-margin attach line.
Google Shopping + Search + Meta from a $0 base. Lead with Google Shopping/Free Listings (no commission, highest intent). Build proper conversion tracking. Run at a disciplined ROAS; scale winners. This is the operator's core day-job — executed in-house, not outsourced at agency markup. See the Google Ads plan for the costed build.
Add Google Shopping, eBay AU, Reebelo NZ, Mighty Ape, Facebook Marketplace — each an incremental demand pool on top of own-site + Trade Me.
Fix technical foundations, optimise collection/category pages (currently weak), build content around the high-volume Dyson/laptop terms TYDI already ranks for, and earn links to lift DR off 2.2. Target: move "dyson v8" (2,600/mo) and peers from page 3 to page 1. Compounding, near-zero marginal cost. See the SEO deep-dive.
Email/SMS lifecycle program to existing buyers. Anchor on parts & accessories cross-sell (esp. Dyson filters/batteries/brushes — a fragmented market TYDI can own) plus repeat-purchase and win-back flows. High margin, low cost, asset already owned. Caveat (UEMA 2007): the ~$60k Year-1 reactivation revenue is only bankable if the list is legally mailable — confirm the consent/opt-in basis in DD before counting it.
Segment the list by what people bought (Dyson owners → parts/upgrades; laptop buyers → accessories/peripherals; etc.). Drive targeted offers, lift AOV and repeat rate, and feed purchase data back into paid as seed/lookalike audiences. Turns a static list into a growth engine.
| Weeks | Focus | Key actions |
|---|---|---|
| 0–2 | Stabilise & handover | Vendor transition; document the sourcing playbook + refurb-bench throughput (the real constraint); secure Dyson contract assignment; audit stock & systems; confirm tracking baseline |
| 2–4 | Foundation: tracking + conversion + feed | Install GA4 + server-side conversion tracking (Stape); fix the highest-leverage site-conversion issues (the site converts <0.1% today); build a clean refurb-compliant product feed; optimise Trade Me listings (the channel selling now) |
| 4–6 | Free listings first | Google Merchant Center free listings (no spend) while the feed + site bed in |
| 5–8 | Switch on paid — gated | Shopping/Search live only once the site converts and the feed is clean — never pay for traffic into a sub-0.1% site (the foundation gates the spend) |
| 4–8 | Database wake-up — consent-gated | Verify UEMA consent first; then import & segment; welcome-back + parts cross-sell flows; first email/SMS campaign |
| 6–10 | eBay AU launch | Register (Payoneer), apply to eBay Refurbished Program, list top SKUs |
| 8–12 | SEO compounding | Technical fixes, collection-page optimisation, content plan for top Dyson/laptop terms |
| By day 90 | Review | Channel-level revenue & margin read; replacement-stock + sourcing position confirmed; double down on what's working; Reebelo application underway |
| Priority | Channel | NZ seller status | Headline fee | Window |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Google Shopping + Free Listings | Live | Free / CPC, no commission | Month 1 |
| 2 | eBay Australia | Live (Payoneer payouts) | ~13–15% FVF + ~1.3% intl | Month 1–3 |
| 3 | Reebelo NZ | Live (vetted application) | ~US$99/mo + 10–15%* | Month 2–4 |
| 4 | Mighty Ape Marketplace | Live (apply) | ~9%* | Month 3–6 |
| 5 | Facebook Marketplace | Live, open | ~$0 (local pickup) | Opportunistic |
Phase 2 (gated): Amazon AU (A$50k Renewed invoice threshold + Dyson brand-gating risk) and Kogan (negotiated commission). Excluded: TikTok Shop & Instagram Shopping (not open to NZ sellers), TheMarket / 1-day / Catch (closed), Temu (not open to NZ sellers + wrong fit). Fees marked * need direct confirmation. Verify Dyson brand-gating before committing inventory to Amazon/Kogan.
| NZD | Today | Year 1 | Year 2 | Year 3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $794k | $1.05M | $1.40M | $1.85M |
| Growth % | — | +32% | +33% | +32% |
| Gross margin | 46% | 45% | 45% | 45% |
| Gross profit | $365k | $473k | $630k | $833k |
| Marketing investment | $0 | $95k | $140k | $175k |
| Staff/manager | — | $85k | $130k | $160k |
| Ops / fulfilment / fees / overhead | — | ~$138k | ~$110k | ~$138k |
| EBITDA (owner-independent) | ~$95k | ~$150k | ~$250k | ~$360k |
Slower channel ramp + continued margin compression → ~$1.25M revenue, ~$200k EBITDA by Year 3. Still a materially larger, more valuable, more diversified business than today.
The acquirer is a professional digital-marketing operator (agency + in-house CMO experience) whose core competencies map 1:1 to the five levers: paid search/shopping, SEO, CRM & segmentation, and multi-channel e-commerce ops. The business's single biggest weakness — the high-intent channels have never been switched on — is the acquirer's single biggest strength. The supply-side risk (sourcing/refurb know-how) is contained by transition, restraint of trade and SOP documentation; the demand-side upside is delivered by the operator directly.
Total raise: ~$525k
Proposed structure (to finalise):
Indicative return: ~$425k all-in entry on ~$175k SDE → a ~$360k-EBITDA business by Year 3 → indicative exit ~$1.2M+ at 3–4× (multiple expansion + earnings growth) → ~2.5–3× MOIC before interim cashflow. Downside covered by realisable stock.
| Risk | Mitigant |
|---|---|
| Vendor SDE overstated | Conditional offer; reconcile to tax/GST/bank; earnout on balance |
| Supplier contracts don't transfer | Written assignment a condition; reprice to asset value if not |
| Owner know-how walks at handover | Transition + restraint; document SOPs; demand engine is operator-supplied |
| Aged/obsolete inventory | Independent stock-take; exclude/discount; consignment on slow lines |
| Marketplace fees / brand-gating | Channel margin model; lead with zero-fee Google Shopping & own site |
| Single-category (Dyson) concentration | Category diversification is an explicit growth lever |
| 6-week ownership flip / continuity | Earnout; verify why prior owner sold; tighten reps & warranties |
| Sourcing capability doesn't transfer; replacement stock (the real constraint) | Sourcing earnout + documented SOPs + replacement-supplier intros as DD conditions; budget replacement-stock working capital (~$50–100k ramp); the consigned pool is a finite ~12-month bridge, not the engine |
| Inherited warranty liability on pre-settlement sales | Quantify historical claim rate × pre-settlement units; fund a warranty escrow/holdback so it doesn't land on the buyer |
| No Greg–Dean operating agreement; buyer key-person risk | Written operating agreement (roles, equity/profit split, decision rights, exit) before the offer; the "demand engine is operator-supplied" mitigant makes the operator the single point of failure |
| Channel projections double-counted | One integrated forecast that nets overlap; per-channel figures are potential, not additive |